THE EFFECTS OF DECLINING VALUE ON COMMUNITY PROPERTY DIVISION

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State Bar Annual Meeting September 24, 2010

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Today's Program

Part B

• IN-SPOUSE GOALS AND OUT-SPOUSE GOALS

Today's Program

Part C • APPROACHES TO DISTRESSED PROPERTY ISSUES AT EACH STAGE

Today's Program

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C1 • Distressed Property Issues at the OSC Stage

• Distressed Property Issues Between OSC and Trial



Today's Program

C4a	 Family Code section 2640(b) Reimbursement Rights
C4b	 Family Code section 2640(c) Reimbursement Rights



Today's Program			
C5a	• Should a Party Receive Blackacre at a Zero Value or be Credited for the Negative Equity?		
C5b	 Other Debt Solutions – Approaches That May Avoid Credit for Negative Equity 		







"Upside Down" vs. "Doomed" Property

"Upside Down" Property: Blackacre's secured debt exceeds its market value

"Doomed" Property: Parties must sell Blackacre or lose it to foreclosure

"Upside Down" vs. "Doomed" Property

- An UPSIDE DOWN Property is not necessarily DOOMED.
- A DOOMED Property is not necessarily UPSIDE DOWN.
- Determining whether Blackacre is **UPSIDE DOWN** is relatively easy, requiring only current loan statement(s) and reliable current appraisal.
- Determining whether Blackacre is **DOOMED** is difficult, requiring a prediction of future events.



DISTRESSED PROPERTY ISSUES ARISE AT THREE STAGES DURING THE DISSOLUTION:

- At OSC
- Between OSC and trial
- At trial

DISTRESSED PROPERTY ISSUES AT THE OSC STAGE:

- Exclusive possession orders (FC§§2047(a), 6324 – orders after notice)
- Expense payment orders (FC§§ 2047(a), 6324 – orders after notice)
- Epstein credit orders
- Watts charge orders

DISTRESSED PROPERTY ISSUES BETWEEN OSC AND TRIAL:

- Trial setting and foot dragging
- Early property disposition orders (FC§2108 authority to liquidate assets)

DISTRESSED PROPERTY ISSUES FOR TRIAL:

- Property valuation date (FC§2552 – trial valuation date or alternate valuation date)
- Characterization and Reimbursement
 - Family Code section 2640(b)
 - Family Code section 2640(c)
 - Moore/Marsden

DISTRESSED PROPERTY ISSUES FOR TRIAL:

- Should the distributee spouse receive credit for Blackacre's negative equity, or receive Blackacre at zero value?
 - FC§2622 negative estates
 - FC§2550 equal division
- Cream limitation

• Some Distressing Concepts

DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT

A deficiency judgment is a personal money judgment entered against a borrower for the difference between the price realized from the security at the foreclosure sale and the outstanding loan balance. (*Cornelison v. Kornbluth* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 590, 603; CCP §§580a, 726(b).)

THREE TYPES OF DEBT:

- Recourse Debt
- Non-Recourse Debt
- "Rarely-Recourse" Debt



"Everybody wants something." It is good to have goals.

In-Spouse vs. Out-Spouse

In-Spouse Irv: in exclusive possession of Blackacre

Out-Spouse Otto: out of Blackacre (whether by choice or by exclusion order)

IRV'S GOALS AT THE OSC STAGE:

- Wants order placing him in temporary exclusive possession of Blackacre
- Does not want order requiring him to pay PITI on Blackacre
- If pays PITI, wants to receive *Epstein* credits for payments
- Does not want to owe *Watts* charges to the community

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OTTO'S GOALS AT THE OSC STAGE:

- Does not want order placing Irv in temporary exclusive possession
- Wants order requiring Irv to pay PITI on Blackacre
- Does not want Irv to receive *Epstein* credits for PITI payments
- Wants Irv to owe *Watts* charges to community

IRV'S GOALS BETWEEN OSC AND TRIAL:

- Wants a trial date as far in the future as possible
- Does not want an early disposition of property order

OTTO'S GOALS BETWEEN OSC AND TRIAL:

- Wants a trial date as soon as possible
- Wants an early disposition of property order

IRV'S GOALS FOR TRIAL:

- Wants Blackacre valued as of date of trial
- Wants to be awarded Blackacre
- Wants favorable rulings regarding FC§2640(b), FC§2640(c) and *Moore/Marsden*
- If Blackacre is awarded to him, Irv wants to take it at negative value

OTTO'S GOALS FOR TRIAL:

- Wants Blackacre valued as of date of separation
- Wants favorable rulings regarding FC§2640(b), FC§2640(c) and *Moore/Marsden*
- If Blackacre is awarded to Irv, wants Irv to take it at zero value
- If Blackacre not awarded to Irv at zero value, wants Blackacre sold or abandoned

ASSUME, FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES:

- Blackacre, the family residence, is community property.
- Blackacre is both Upside Down and Doomed.
- At OSC, the trial court:
 - Placed Irv in exclusive temporary possession of Blackacre, and
 - Ordered Irv to keep current Blackacre's PITI payments.

• Approaches to Distressed Property Issues at Each Stage

• Distressed Property Issues at the OSC Stage

ISSUES AT THE OSC STAGE:

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EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION ORDERS AND WATTS CHARGES:

"To **stay** or not to stay, that is the question."

PITI PAYMENT ORDERS AND EPSTEIN CREDITS:

"To **pay** or not to pay, that is the question.

Temporary Use

IRV CONTENDS AT OSC:

- The court may issue orders for the temporary use, possession, and control of property of the parties and the payment of any liens or encumbrances coming due during the period the order is in effect. (FC§§2047(a), 6324.)
- Under this authority the court should grant Irv temporary possession of Blackacre.

Temporary Use

OTTO CONTENDS AT OSC:

- The court should not grant temporary possession of Blackacre to Irv, because it is a Doomed Property and should be sold.
- If the court does award temporary possession to Irv, it should be without prejudice to Otto's anticipated motion for a pretrial disposition of Blackacre.

The Court Should Rule at the OSC

Both parties want rulings on *Epstein* credits and *Watts* charges

Both cite *In Re Marriage of Hebbring* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1260, in which Justice King stated:

"Finally, the worst alternative is simply to defer the issue of reimbursement for decision by the trial judge."

Payment Orders

OTTO CONTENDS AT OSC:

- The court may issue orders for the payment of any liens or encumbrances. (FC§§2047(a), 6324.)
- Under this authority the court should order Irv to make the PITI payments.
- Otto does not want his credit damaged.
- Otto desires loan modification or a short sale, and failure to pay PITI may complicate these possible solutions.



Payment Orders

IRV CONTENDS AT OSC:

• He should not be ordered to pay PITI on Blackacre, because Blackacre is Doomed and PITI payments will not be any benefit to the community

Epstein Credits

• IRV CONTENDS AT OSC:

- Existing precedent grants him *Epstein* credits for his post-separation PITI payments.
- "Thus, application of the no-reimbursement rule will discourage payment of community debts after separation, exacerbate the financial and emotional disruption which all too frequently accompanies the breakup of a marriage and, perhaps, result in impairing the credit reputations of both spouses." (In re Marriage of *Epstein* (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76, 84.)

Epstein Credits

• OTTO CONTENDS AT OSC:

- Existing precedent is inapposite because Blackacre is a Doomed Property.
- Irv's post-separation PITI payments regarding a Doomed property don't benefit the community.
- *Epstein* credits to Irv would require Otto to pay a portion of a payment for which he will never receive a benefit.
- Therefore, Irv should receive no Epstein credits.



• OTTO CONTENDS:

• Existing precedent requires Irv to pay the community *Watts* charges for Irv's post-separation use of Blackacre.



• IRV CONTENDS:

- He should not be subject to *Watts* charges because Blackacre is a Doomed Property regarding which no payments should be made.
- Since the community has no investment/equity in Blackacre, the community should receive no return.
- Once in default the community would not have the right to receive rents because of the trust deed's "assignment of rents" clause.

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• Distressed Property Issues Between OSC and Trial

Trial Setting and Foot Dragging

IRV is motivated to do everything he can to delay the setting of trial in hopes that the real estate market continues to decline, and will allow him to retain Blackacre at a lower fair market value and greater negative equity.

This would allow Irv to receive other assets or an equalizing payment from Otto.

Trial Setting and Foot Dragging

OTTO wants the trial set as quickly as possible or, in the alternative, an early disposition order.

Otto is concerned about further losses to the community, and concerned about building *Epstein* credits in favor of Irv.

Pretrial Disposition Orders

IRV CONTENDS that, pursuant to *Lee v Superior Court (Lee)* (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 705, a pretrial disposition order should be issued only where:

- It is necessary for a community asset to be sold (in *Lee*, a parcel of real estate) in order to preserve another community asset (in *Lee*, a business); and
- The court has made adequate safeguards to protect the interests of the spouse opposing the sale.

Pretrial Disposition Orders

OTTO CONTENDS that *Lee v Superior Court* was superseded by the 1994 passage of Family Code section 2108 which states:

"At any time during the proceeding, the court has the authority, on application of a party and for good cause, to order the liquidation of community . . . assets so as to avoid unreasonable market or investment risks, given the relative nature, scope, and extent of the community estate."



OTTO CONTENDS that Family Code section 2108 empowers the trial court to issue a pretrial order that Blackacre be either:

- Awarded to a spouse and valued at the date of the disposition to that spouse;
- Sold to a third party; or
- Abandoned to foreclosure.

• Distressed Property Issues for the Trial

Valuation Date

IRV CONTENDS that Blackacre should be valued as of date of trial, pursuant to Family Code section 2552(a):

"... except as provided in subdivision (b), the court shall value the assets and liabilities as near as practicable to the time of trial."



OTTO CONTENDS that Blackacre should be valued as of date of separation, pursuant to Family Code section 2552(b):

"... the court for good cause shown may value ... assets and liabilities at a date after separation and before trial to accomplish an equal division of the community estate of the parties in an equitable manner."



OTTO MAY CONTEND that Irv employed unfair gambits (e.g., delaying discovery responses, obtaining continuances through false pretences) to intentionally delay the trial as long as possible so Blackacre's value would be reduced.



OTTO INTRODUCES INTO EVIDENCE letters his attorney sent to Irv's attorney, demanding that Irv cooperate with an immediate sale of Blackacre and warning Irv that any failure to cooperate would breach Irv's of fiduciary duties. Otto contends that Irv's refusal to cooperate justifies:

- Denial of *Epstein* credits to Irv;
- Asset valuation as of date of separation; and
- Section 2108 early disposition order.



IRV CONTENDS that a delay in bringing a case to trial by itself does not justify an alternate valuation date as held by *In re Marriage of Priddis* (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 349:

- H had exclusive occupancy of family residence, and paid its mortgage, during the parties' 11-year separation.
- Trial court valued residence as of date of separation, due to the long delay in bringing the case to trial.
- Court of appeal reversed, holding as follows:

Valuation Date (continued)

"We perceive nothing in the fact of a lengthy separation, standing alone, that necessitates an alternate valuation date to accomplish the equal and equitable division of community property . . . On the contrary, under such circumstances, when the value of community assets has been affected by inflation or other market factors, the fairest equal division of those assets lets the parties share equally in either gains or losses." (*Priddis*, at pp. 357-358.)



IRV CONTENDS that the traditional reasoning for a date of separation valuation (i.e. postseparation efforts such as involved in a professional practice – see *In Re Marriage of Green* (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 14) is not generally applicable to valuation of real property.



IRV CONTENDS that the rationale of *In Re Marriage of Lehman* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 169 supports a date of trial valuation of the declining real estate, as both parties must share in increases and decreases in value that result from market forces.



OTTO COUNTERS that the rationale of *In Re Marriage of Hokanson* (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 987 (wife's unreasonable failure to cooperate with the court's orders for the sale of a house is a breach of fiduciary duty) supports an alternate valuation date under FC§2552(b).

 Characterization and Reimbursement Issues for Trial

Philosophy behind FC § 2640(b)

Because Separatizer CAN'T PROFIT it gets special protection

If future inflation, mortgage principal reduction and/or capital improvements increase the property's equity, Separatizer's right of reimbursement is FIRST TO BE REPLENISHED.

A Refi Is Either ...

"Static Refi" Refi of existing loan (e.g. obtain a lower interest %) with no equity invasion "Cash Out Refi"

Or Both

Refi that invades equity There are net Loan Proceeds to analyze





"Squander" is a Term of Art

- The term "Squander" is used to mean expenditure of Cash Out Refi Proceeds for any kind of non-recoupable expense:
 - Even, for example, to pay for a life-saving medical treatment
 - "Squandered" doesn't mean "paid foolishly"
- "Invest", in contrast, means expenditure of Cash Out Refi Proceeds to acquire or improve an asset still in existence on date of trial

"What happened to our equity?"

- Spouses obtained CASH OUT REFI PROCEEDS from Blackacre, and either:
 - "SQUANDERED" the proceeds ("Blackacre as ATM"); or
 - INVESTED the proceeds (*Walrath* question)
- Now Blackacre has DECLINED IN VALUE.

Effect of Cash Out Loans on FC 2640(b)

- Additional loans secured by the property reduce net equity and can diminish 2640(b) reimbursement rights
 - A HELOC is no exception
 - All equity is available to the community, even if using it diminishes equity
 - Purpose of loan does not change the fact that it reduces the net equity

P	urc	hase	e D	ata

FMV at Purchase	500k
CP 1st Mort (interest only)	<u>(400k)</u>
SP 2640 Contrib. (down pmt)	100k

Subsequent Increase in Value		
FMV Increased to	700k	
1 st Mort Balance (same)	<u>(400k)</u>	
Net Equity	300k	
2640 Burden Remains	100k	

Subsequent HELOC Decreases E	lquity
FMV	700k
1 st Mort Balance (same)	(400k)
HELOC (squandered, not invested)	<u>(250k)</u>
Net Equity	50k
2640 Burden Amount	50k

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Subsequent Decline in Value	
FMV Reduced to	600k
1 st Mort Balance (same)	(400k)
HELOC Balance (same)	<u>(250k)</u>
Net Equity	(50k)
2640 Burden Amount	0

Have Your *Walrath* Chops Grown Rusty?

When Blackacre and Whiteacre both APPRECIATED, *Walrath* was irrelevant, because there was sufficient EQUITY in BOTH PROPERTIES to reimburse our generous Separatizer

But now that real estate is DOWN, *Walrath* is UP

Example: Blackacre Refi / Whiteacre Purchase

Parties use the \$100k to buy jointly-titled Whiteacre

Cash Out Refi Proceeds of \$100k

Blackacre's equity is \$500k

\$200k (40%) = H2640 / \$300k (60%) = CP

Blackacre is CP subject to H2640(b)

Walrath: \$100k is pro-rated

<u>Equity</u>	<u>from Blackacre</u>	<u>to Whiteacre</u>		
H2640(b)	\$100k x 40% =	\$ 40k		
СР	\$100k x 60% =	\$ 60k		
RESULT: A pro rated \$40k of the				
H2640(b) burden is moved from				
Blackacre to Whiteacre by				
"forced election."				

In 1998, FC § 2640(b) provided:

"... the [separatizer] shall be reimbursed for the [separatizer's] contributions to the acquisition of **THE PROPERTY** to the extent the [separatizer] traces the contributions to a separate property source. The amount reimbursed ... may not exceed the net value of **THE PROPERTY** at the time of the division."

The Three Walrath Opinions

If the asset has sufficient equity at time of trial, the separatizer may be reimbursed from:



Senate Bill 1407 became effective 1/1/05

It cured the IRMO Cross problem with FC § 2640(c)

SB 1407 changed Section 2640(b) to read:

"... the [separatizer] shall be reimbursed for the [separatizer's] contributions to the acquisition of **PROPERTY OF THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY ESTATE** [formerly, "THE PROPERTY"] to the extent the [separatizer] traces the contributions to a separate property source. The amount reimbursed ... may not exceed the net value of **THE PROPERTY** at the time of the division."

About Our Omniscient Legislature...

"The Legislature, of course, is deemed to be aware of . . . judicial decisions . . . in existence, and to have . . . amended a statute in light thereof."

People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329

How Retro of you...

ISSUE:

Does SB 1407 retroactively apply to a pre-2005 contribution of separate property?

ANSWER:

"No."

Section 4 and Fellows

Family Code section 4 states the general rule that all Family Code amendments are fully retroactive. See *In re Marriage of Fellows* (2006) 39 Cal.4th 179).

Section 4 and Fellows

Family Code section 4(h) states the exception: "If . . . the court determines, that application of a particular provision of the new law . . . in the manner required by this section . . . would **substantially interfere with . . . the rights of the parties** . . . in connection with an event that occurred or circumstance that existed before the operative date, **the court may**, notwithstanding this section . . . **apply . . . the old law** to the extent reasonably necessary to mitigate the substantial interference."

Hey, Remember Me?

- In re Marriage of Buol (1985) 39 Cal.3d 751
- In re Marriage of Fabian (1986) 41 Cal.3d 440
- In re Marriage of Hilke (1992) 4 Cal.4th 215
- In re Marriage of Heikes (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1211

• Family Code section 2640(c) Reimbursement Rights

Family Code §2640(c):

"A party shall be reimbursed for the party's separate property contributions to the acquisition of property of the other spouse's separate property estate during the marriage, unless there has been a transmutation in writing pursuant to Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 850) of Part 2 of Division 4, or a written waiver of the right to reimbursement. The amount reimbursed shall be without interest or adjustment for change in monetary values and may not exceed the net value of the property at the time of the division."

Family Code §2640(c):

- 1. Not limited to a disso action, as are:
 - a) FC §2581 ("For the purpose of division of property on dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the parties "); and
 - b) FC §2640(b) ("In the division of the community estate under this division")
- No reimbursement right if there has been a FC §852 transmutation (unlike FC §2640(b)).

Family Code §2640(c):

- Like FC \$2640(b), reimbursement limited to net value of the property "... at time of the division." Query: when is the division?
- 4. Query: does the SP Owner have a fiduciary duty to the SP Contributor to preserve the Contributor's reimbursement right? (See dicta in *In Re Marriage of Walker* (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1408, 1419 to the effect that a spouse does have a fiduciary duty to the other spouse as to separate property.)
- 5. Query: do *Walrath* principles apply to a \$2640(c) reimbursement right? Arguably MORE SO.



Trial Judges Arguably Have Discretion

"Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered." (*Ginns v. Savage* (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520.)

Moore/Marsden and the Unpaid Loan Balance

- The *Moore/Marsden* formula:
 - Credits the COMMUNITY with its CASH contributions (e.g., its payments that reduce mortgage principal).
 - Credits the SEPARATIZER with her/his CASH contributions (e.g., down payment, pre-marital principal payments).
 - Credits the **SEPARATIZER** with the **UNPAID LOAN BALANCE**.



If the Unpaid Loa	an Balance Is Ignored:
Community's CASH loan principal payments	
Separatizer's CASH loan principal payments	
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X FMV appreciation from DOM to DOT

"Cash is King" M/M Step II <u>CP principal payments</u> total principal pmts

X FMV appreciation from DOM to DOT

Effect of the Unpaid Loan Balance on *M*/*M*:

- H purchases property before marriage
- Purchase price \$500,000
- HSP down payment \$500
- Mortgage \$499,500
- Before marriage, H pays down mortgage \$300
- Community pays down mortgage **\$50,000**
- After separation, H pays down mortgage **\$200**
- During marriage, property appreciates **\$400,000**

If the loan balance is CONSIDERED:				
W	45k (10%)			
Н	<u>406k</u> (90%)			
Total	451k (100%)			
If the loan balance is	s <u>IGNORED:</u>			
W	221k (49%)			
Н	<u>230k</u> (51%)			
Total	451k (100%)			
Non constation M/ room				
Non-separatizer W rece				
Separatizer H receives	\$176k LESS			

Depreciated Property M/M Facts

- H bought Blackacre before DOM (remained in HSP title throughout marriage)
- H paid:
 - down payment at purchase date, and
 - loan principal payments before DOM
- Community paid loan principal payments during marriage (no refi)
- Property <u>DEPRECIATED</u> during marriage

Depreciated Property M/M Issues:

Should the community's *M*/*M* rights:

- Be REDUCED by a pro rata share of the depreciation during marriage (Step I reimbursement REDUCED by Step II pro rata depreciation allocation)?
- Be LIMITED to the date of trial equity in the property?
- Focus on EQUITY instead of appreciation?
- Consider the unpaid LOAN BALANCE?

	<u>FMV</u>	MORT	Equity
Purch.	900k	810k	90k
	<u>no change</u>	<u>30k</u>	
DOM	900k	780k	120k
	<u>200k</u>	<u>(180k)</u>	
DOT	700k	600k	100k

Traditional Moore/Marsden Formula

STEP #1: Dollar-for-dollar reimbursement to the community of its \$180k loan principal payments.

STEP #2: Pro tanto allocation between community and separatizer of the property's APPRECIATION during marriage.

Three Depreciated M/M Solutions			
SOLUTION	TO COMM		
Solution A: Full Step I reimbursement to the community	180k		
Solution B: Step I reimbursement, reduced by share of Step II loss	140k		
Solution C: Step I reimbursement, limited to date of trial equity	100k		

Additional Possible Solutions	
SOLUTION	TO COMM
Solution D: Divide the equity, ignoring the loan balance	6ok
Solution E: Divide the equity, considering the loan balance	20k

Solution A

Full Step I reimbursement to the community: \$180k CP

\$180k due to community

(\$100k) date of trial equity

\$80k PAID BY SEPARATIZER

Solution B		
Step I reimbursement, reduced by share of Step II loss: \$140k CP		
Reimburse principal pay down 180k		
<u>180k</u> x (200k) 900k ^x (200k)	= <u>(40k)</u>	
Due to community	140k	

Solution C

Step I reimbursement limited to date of trial equity: \$100k CP

\$18ok community's principal payments
(\$8ok) not reimbursable (lack of equity)

\$100k DATE OF TRIAL EQUITY



Don't pro rate the APPRECIATION (there is none) . . .

. . . instead pro rate the EQUITY
Solution D

Divide the equity, ignoring the loan balance: \$60k CP

(Solution D believes that "Cash is King")

Facts required for Solution D: Amounts of CASH CONTRIBUTIONS made by separatizer and community.

Sol. D	<u>FMV</u>	MORT	Equity
Purch.	900k	810k	90k HSP
	<u>no change</u>	<u>(30k) HSP</u>	1155
DOM	900k	780k	120k
	<u>(200k)</u>	<u>(180k) CP</u>	
DOT	700k	600k	100k





Solution E

Divide the equity, considering the loan balance: \$20k CP

Solution E believes: "The loan balance counts!"

Facts required for Solution E: amounts of Cash contributions made by separatizer and community and the unpaid Loan Balance.

Sol. E	<u>FMV</u>	<u>MORT</u>	Equity
Purch.	900k	810k	90k
	<u>no change</u>	<u>(30k) HSP</u>	HSP
DOM	900k	780k	120k
	<u>(200k)</u>	<u>(180k) CP</u>	-
DOT	700k	600k	100k





HSP = 720k / 900k = 80%





An Opportunity for Change . . .

Should rules regarding depreciated *Moore/Marsden* be tailored to benefit the community? The separatizer?

Is this an opportunity to right wrongs?

Do existing precedents unduly benefit the community? The separatizer?

What do YOU think?

M/M Currently Favors the Separatizer

- 1. M/M gives the community NO CREDIT for its mortgage INTEREST payments, property TAX payments and INSURANCE payments
- 2. Unless there has been a *Grinius* refi, the unpaid mortgage balance benefits the separatizer in the pro tanto calculations

M/M Currently Favors the Community

1. M/M grants the community:

- a) A co-ownership interest in the property that is enforceable in DEATH, as well as in divorce.
- b) A pro tanto SHARE IN APPRECIATION. (M/M is superior in both ways to FC §2640.)
- 2. The community pays the separatizer NO WATTS CHARGES for its use of the property. (In re Marriage of Nelson (2006) 39 Cal.App.4th 1546.)

M/M Currently Favors the Community

- 3. COMMUNITY INCOME TAXES HAVE BEEN REDUCED if (as is likely) the parties have jointly claimed the mortgage interest and property tax deductions.
- 4. The community pro tanto fraction is multiplied times the property appreciation THROUGHOUT MARRIAGE, despite the fact that the community payments were NOT MADE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MARRIAGE.

Reasons to Favor the Community

Although the separatizer has concededly suffered a loss due to the declining market, that loss isn't the community's "fault" (any more than it is the separatizer's "fault").

In point of fact, the separatizer's loss would have been GREATER were it not for the community's mortgage principal pay down.

Reasons to Favor the Community



Reasons to Favor the Community

Authorities confirming community's right to reimbursement for payments benefiting SP:

•Weinberg v. Weinberg (1967) 67 Cal.2d 557, 562-563

•*Marriage of Walter* (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 802, 805-806

•*Marriage of Frick* (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 997, 1010

Complex Issues, Vol. E, Ch. 2

 A separatizer using CP to benefit SP breaches his/her fiduciary duty to the community, which results in the imposition of a constructive trust over the SP pursuant to Civil Code §1575.

2. The community receives reimbursement as a restitution remedy.

Reasons to Favor the Community "If the trial court determines that the improvements to the trailer did not enhance the property's value, [the nonseparatizer Wife's] recovery will be limited to reimbursement of one-half of the community funds spent on improving the [separatizer's] property." (*Bono v Clark*, at p. 1425.)

Reasons to Favor the Community

Moore/Marsden should reward the community with priority creditor status, in recognition of the community's willingness to invest in separatizer property . . .

... the same way FC § 2640 rewards the separatizer with priority creditor status, in recognition of the separatizer's willingness to invest in community property.

Reason to Favor the Separatizer

Counter-argument to the foregoing:

The Family Code section 2640 separatizer is MORE worthy of priority creditor status than is the *Moore/Marsden* community.

The *Moore/Marsden* community has a hope of receiving return on its investment, whereas the Family Code section 2640 separatizer has no such hope.

Moorebeam/Moorath Hypothetical Facts

- Blackacre is HSP with M/M
- \$300k in cash out refi proceeds are borrowed against Blackacre
- The \$300k in proceeds are used to purchase Whiteacre, which is owned in joint title

Moorebeam/Moorath Issues

- What relative CP and HSP interests have been transferred into Whiteacre?
- What relative CP and HSP interests remain in Blackacre?

Four Approaches to M/M Cash Out Refi

<i>Beam</i> "family expense tracing" doctrine	"FIRST OUT" refi proceeds are CP
<i>Walrath</i> "pro rata" doctrine	PRORATED refi proceeds are CP
<i>Grinius</i> "intent of the lender" doctrine	ALL refi proceeds are CP
"Unfeasible" doctrine	"FIRST OUT" refi proceeds are SP

No Precedent Yet

No appellate case has yet said what happens when <u>Cash Out Loan Proceeds</u> are taken from "HSP with M/M."

Is "*Moorebeam/Moorath*" in your office now?

	<u>FMV</u>	<u>MORT</u>	Equity
Purchase (=DOM)	600k	150k	450k
	<u>+200k</u>	<u>(150k)</u>	
Day Before Refi	800k	0	800k











"CP First ("*Moorebeam*") Approach" (\$200k is CP --remaining \$100k is HSP)

> Judge Able agrees, because consistent with *Beam*.

Judge Adept disagrees, because inconsistent with *Walrath*.



If Moorebeam, result as to Whiteacre

If the \$300k comes "CP FIRST" out of Blackacre as: \$200k = CP equity \$100k = HSP equity

Will Whiteacre also be owned PRO RATA?

Or will H be limited to a \$100k FC§2640 reimbursement right?

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H will be limited to a \$100k FC §2640 reimbursement right

(FC §2851)









Moorebeam/Moorath Issues

- A question exists whether *M*/*M* Step II calculations should be performed at the time of refi
- There is a significantly different result:
 - Compare Table 1 and Table 2.





- Entire \$300k is CP
- No portion is HSP



C5a

 Should a Party Receive Blackacre at a Zero Value or be Credited for the Negative Equity?

Negative or Zero Value on CP Balance Sheet?

Issue:

What amount should be entered for Blackacre in Irv's column on the community property balance sheet:

- Negative \$100k ("the Negative Option" that Irv wants), or
- Zero ("the **Zero Option**" that Otto wants)?



Net Negative Estates

Where the entire estate is negative, the court has broad discretion pursuant to FC§2622(b):

"To the extent the community debts exceed total community and quasi-community assets, the excess of debt shall be assigned as the court deems just and equitable, taking into account factors such as the parties' relative ability to pay."

In this circumstance, the court can award Upside Down, Doomed Blackacre to Irv at a zero value.



Net Positive Estates

Where the property is Upside Down but the overall community estate has a positive value, the court is required to make a mathematically equal division of the parties' community property assets and liabilities pursuant to the mandates of FC§2550:

"Except upon the written agreement of the parties...the court shall...divide the community estate of the parties equally."

Court Must "Value" Liabilities

Family Code section 2552(a): "... the court shall value the assets and liabilities"

Family Code section 2551: "... in ... assigning the liabilities of the parties for which the community estate is liable, the court shall characterize liabilities as separate or community and confirm or assign them to the parties in accordance with Part 6 (commencing with Section 2620)."

ISSUE: in dealing with an Upside Down property, how is the court to "value" the asset and the liability?



THREE TYPES OF DEBT:

- Recourse Debt
- Non-Recourse Debt
- "Rarely-Recourse" Debt

DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT

A deficiency judgment

is a personal money judgment entered against a borrower for the difference between the price realized from the security at a foreclosure sale and the outstanding loan balance. (*Cornelison v. Kornbluth* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 590, 603; CCP §§580a, 726(b).)

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Creditor **MAY OBTAIN** a judgment against Irv and Otto.

Examples:

- An **unsecured** loan.
- A loan **secured against personal property**, such as securities or a vehicle. (*Florio v. Lau* (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 637, 644-645.)

NON-RECOURSE DEBT:

Creditor **MAY NOT OBTAIN** a deficiency judgment against Irv and Otto. Examples:

- A **purchase money loan** secured by a trust deed against a **dwelling.** (CCP §58ob.)
- Any **seller carry back** purchase money loan (even one secured against a non-dwelling). (*Brown v. Jensen* (1953) 41 Cal.2d 193.)

Obligations a Court Must Consider

In Re Marriage of Fonstein (1976) 17 Cal.3d 738, 748: "The obligations to be allocated are those that **could be enforced against one or more assets** included in the division, **either because** the obligation is **secured** by an encumbrance on the asset **or** because **the asset could be reached on execution** if the obligation were reduced to a judgment."

Under this analysis, an asset encumbered by a **nonrecourse loan** should be awarded to the spouse at a zero value and no credit should be given for negative equity. (Analogize with corporate stock.)

"RARELY-RECOURSE" DEBT:

Creditor **MAY WITH DIFFICULTY OBTAIN** a deficiency judgment against Irv and Otto.

- Judicial foreclosure is required.
- Irv and Otto have a 12-month right of redemption (CCP §729.030(b)).

EXAMPLES OF "RARELY-RECOURSE" DEBT:

- Any **non-purchase money** mortgage loan (CCP §§580b, d), such as a HELOC.
- A purchase money mortgage loan secured against a non-dwelling. (CCP §§58ob, d).
- A lien that was **subordinated** to a construction loan. (*Spangler v. Memel* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 603.)
- The loan was **secured against a property other than the property sold**. (*Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino* (1963) 59 Cal.2d 35)

WHAT ABOUT A REFINANCED LOAN?

- A non-recourse loan refied with additional equity removed becomes a rarely-recourse loan. (CCP §580b.)
- A non-recourse loan refied (with no additional equity removed) with the same lender remains a non-recourse loan. (*DeBerard v Lim* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 659.)
- A non-recourse loan refied (with no additional equity removed) with a different lender becomes a rarely-recourse loan. (Union Bank v Wendlend (1976) 54 Cal.App. 3d 393.)

FIVE POSSIBLE REASONS TO PAY A DEBT:

- 1. Avoid a collection lawsuit
- 2. Protect credit score
- 3. Avoid cancellation of debt tax liability
- 4. Protect reputation
- 5. Fulfill moral obligation to pay

The Court May Disregard a Speculative Liability

Generally, liabilities that are speculative are not to be taken into account in valuing community property for purposes of division:

- See *In re Marriage of Fonstein* (1976) 17 Cal.App.3d 738 regarding speculative tax consequences.
- See In re Marriage of Stratton (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 173, 176, which states it is inappropriate to consider speculative costs of sale of real property in determining value.

A Reason to Favor the Zero Option

Trial courts are encouraged to maximize the community property estate. (*In re Marriage of Kozen* (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1258.) The Zero Option enlarges the community property estate.

Reasons to Favor the Negative Option

A judge may favor the Negative Option if:

- Irv has physical custody of a minor child who would benefit from remaining in Blackacre.
- Otto reduced Blackacre's equity in breach of his fiduciary duties to Irv (e.g., by gambling away HELOC proceeds).
- Irv lost a Family Code section 2640 reimbursement right in Blackacre.
- Irv was particularly attached to Blackacre. (In re Marriage of Fink [Fink II] (1979) 25 Cal.3d 877.)



Otto's Pre-trial Tactic

Perhaps **OTTO**, heeding his divorce lawyer's sage advice, avoided Negative Option/Zero Option debate entirely . . .

... by obtaining a pre-trial loan modification reducing the mortgage balance to (or below) Blackacre's fair market value.

Must Irv Cooperate?

If Irv refuses to cooperate with Otto's attempt to obtain a pre-trial loan modification, does the court have authority to compel Irv's cooperation?

The Court May Dispense with Irv's Consent

Section 1101(e) provides, in pertinent part:

"In any transaction affecting community property in which the consent of both spouses is required, the court may, upon the motion of a spouse, dispense with the requirement of the other spouse's consent if both of the following requirements are met:

- (1) The proposed transaction is in the best interest of the community.
- (2) Consent has been arbitrarily refused"

Otto's Tactic at Trial

OTTO offers as trial evidence:

- Expert testimony that **loan modification** was feasible, and
- A copy of the letter Otto's lawyer sent Irv's lawyer warning that, if Irv refused to cooperate with **loan modification**, Otto would use Irv's refusal in support of the Zero Option.

Otto's Tactic at Trial

OTTO offers as trial evidence:

- Expert testimony that **short sale** was feasible, and
- A copy of the letter Otto's lawyer sent Irv's lawyer warning that, if Irv refused to cooperate with the **short sale**, Otto would use Irv's refusal in support of the Zero Option.



OTTO offers as trial evidence:

- Expert testimony that **deed in lieu of foreclosure** was feasible, and
- A copy of the letter Otto's lawyer sent Irv's lawyer warning that, if Irv refused to cooperate with the **deed in lieu of foreclosure**, Otto would use Irv's refusal in support of the Zero Option.

The Mystery of FICO Scores

IRV argues for the Negative Option, contending that collection lawsuit avoidance is only one reason for payment of a debt, and citing four other reasons:

- Protecting credit score,
- Avoiding cancellation of debt tax liability,
- Protecting **reputation**, and
- Fulfilling moral obligation to pay.

More about that credit score issue ...

FICO computation:

Payment History (35%) Credit Utilization (30%) Length of Credit History (15%) Recent Inquiries (10%) Types of Credit (10%)

FICO computation:

Payment History (35%)

- Payment track record
- Length of positive history
- •Amount of current unpaid debt
- Time elapsed since last negative item
- •Severity and quantities of delinquencies

FICO computation:

Credit Utilization (30%)

- Number of accounts
- Amount of revolving debt
- Ratio of revolving debt balances to credit limits (paying off debt will lower the "utilization ratio")

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FICO computation:

Length of Credit History (15%)

- How long accounts have been active
- Length of time since accounts were used

Recent Inquiries (10%)

Types of Credit (10%)



Potential Tax Liability

IRV argues for the Negative Option, contending that collection lawsuit avoidance is only one reason for payment of a debt, and citing four other reasons:

- Protecting credit score,
- Avoiding cancellation of debt tax liability,
- Protecting **reputation**, and
- Fulfilling moral obligation to pay

"Cancellation of debt"

"Cancellation of debt" is the commonly used term.

The Internal Revenue Code refers to it as "relief from debt."

(For example, see IRS form 982).

Transactions That Trigger COD Tax Liability

Transactions which reduce or forgive a debt owing by a taxpayer may result in tax liability for cancellation of debt (COD tax liability). This is true in each of the following circumstances:

- Loan modification which reduces loan principal or forgives accrued interest.
- Short sale.
- Deed in lieu of foreclosure.
- Foreclosure without a deficiency judgment.

Form 1099C

If a lender cancels or reduces debt, the lender is required to issue a 1099C to the borrower. One problem here is that the lender will include the "fair value" in the 1099C, and it may be an inflated figure creating the appearance of a larger forgiveness of debt.

Recourse vs. Rarely-Recourse Loans

A distinction between recourse loans and rarely-recourse loans:

- A taxpayer does incur COD tax liability when relief is from recourse debt.
- The taxpayer does not incur COD tax liability when relief from non-recourse debt, unless the relief is due to:
 - A short sale, or
 - A loan modification of the principal balance.

Recent Legislative Relief

Recent federal legislation relieves a taxpayer of COD tax liability regarding a debt secured against the taxpayer's principal residence.

It is important that the taxpayer report the transaction.

Note that if both spouses vacate the property and rent it to a third party, they will lose their COD tax liability relief, because the property will no longer be their principal residence.







OTTO CONTENDS that the court should force Irv to choose between:

- Accepting the Zero Option, or
- Suffering an order that Blackacre be disposed of either:
 - By sale to a third party or
 - By abandonment to foreclosure



IRV CONTENDS that that the court may not force him to make this choice, because *In re Marriage of Cream* (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 81 forbids a court from:

- Conducting an auction, or
- Negotiating with a party

The Problem with Continuing Loan Liability

Is awarding Blackacre to Irv without taking Otto off the mortgage an equal division?

Arguably not – if the trial court fails to remove Otto from the mortgage, the trial court has failed to divide the community because the community mortgage debt is still "perched" on Otto's credit score.



How Should the Court Handle the Continuing Loan Liability?

The Court has the authority:

Family Code section 2601: "Where economic circumstances warrant, the court may award an asset of the community estate to one party **on such conditions as the court deems proper** to effect a substantially equal division of the community estate."

How Should the Court Handle the Continuing Loan Liability?

The court's options:

- Require Irv to defend and hold Otto harmless
- Irv to obtain loan assumption
- Require Irv to refinance mortgage

Structuring these Requirements

How should the refi requirement be structured – as a condition subsequent or as a covenant?

- If a contractual condition subsequent is not satisfied, the contract is cancelled.
- If a contractual covenant is not performed, the party who failed to perform the covenant must make alternate performance or be liable to pay damages to the other party.



Example of condition subsequent refi requirement:

"Irv shall use all reasonable, good faith efforts to forthwith refinance Blackacre to obtain net refinance proceeds of \$_____ [e.g., the amount Irv needs to cash out Otto's interest]. Otto shall cooperate with Irv's efforts. If Irv is unable to so refinance Blackacre on or before ______, the parties' settlement agreement in this matter shall be cancelled. The case is calendared for further settlement conference on ______ and for trial on ______.



Example of a covenant refi requirement:

"Irv shall use all reasonable, good faith efforts to forthwith refinance Blackacre to obtain net refinance proceed of \$_____ [e.g., the amount Irv needs to cash out Otto's interest]. Otto shall cooperate with Irv's efforts. If Irv is unable to so refinance Blackacre on or before _____, the parties shall forthwith list Blackacre for sale with a mutually-acceptable real estate broker and shall accept the earliest reasonable offer to purchase Blackacre. Any net sale proceeds shall be distributed between the parties as follows: _____. The court shall retain jurisdiction over all matters regarding Blackacre, including its listing and sale.

Is a Deferred Sale Order Appropriate?

Will a Family Code section 3800 deferred sale order be appropriate?

Such an order requires a determination of economic feasibility under Family Code section 3801.



Is a Deferred Sale Order Appropriate?

FC§3801(c) provides, in pertinent part:

"It is the intent of the Legislature, by requiring the determination under this section, to do all of the following: (1) Avoid the likelihood of possible defaults on the payments of notes and resulting foreclosures."

FC§3802 requires the court to consider: "The economic detriment to the non-resident parent in the event of a deferred sale of a home order."

Is Reserving Jurisdiction Appropriate?

- The court's obligation is to divide the community estate at time of trial. (FC§§ 2550, 2552.)
- The Kelley issue.

Was the Parental Loan "Real" or "Illusory"?

In re Marriage of Kelley (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 82.

- Recognize a loan that is enforceable.
- Any concern about subsequent forgiveness or cancellation is not applicable to the community's liability.

• Reservation of jurisdiction is not appropriate.

The same rationale should apply to "rarely-recourse" loans. This would support giving credit for the negative equity.



